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Abstract
Markets for pollution have become a popular regulatory instrument. Yet these
markets are often highly concentrated, which may lead to strategic behavior by
all participants. In this article we investigate the implications of strategic trade
in pollution permits. The permit market is developed as a strategic market game,
where all firms are allowed to behave strategically and their roles as buyers or sellers
of permits are determined endogenously with price-mediated trade. In a second
stage, firms transact on a product market and we allow for a variety of market
structures. Our framework establishes the endogenous determination of equilibrium
price, market structure, and levels of exchange in the permit market.
Key words: Pollution market, Market power, Strategic market game.
JEL classification: C72, D43, D51, L13, Q53.
1 Introduction
Markets for pollution permits have emerged as a mainstream regulatory instrument.
Since the early adoption of the US Acid Rain Program numerous schemes have been
established to control pollution.1 Behind this spirited regulatory response lies the eco-
nomic rationale of least-cost pollution control: aggregate control costs are minimized
when players trade pollution permits. This least-cost result relies on the existence of
low transactions costs as well as players acting competitively.2 Yet players’ strategic be-
havior in these markets—and the resulting social losses—are a real concern (Montero,
2009; Hintermann, 2015).3 The actions of large and influential players in the market have
1Examples include the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative (RGGI), Western Climate Initiative (WCI), and New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZ ETS).
Markets are also commencing in South Korea, China, and India.
2In early schemes transaction costs appeared to be problematic, for example, in the Fox river (O’Neil
et al., 1983) and RECLAIM (Foster and Hahn, 1995). Yet in most modern permit markets prohibitive
transaction costs do not appear to be a significant problem. Aside from cost effectiveness, a whole host
of explanations can be proposed for explaining inefficiency within schemes, such as the political economy
aspects of regulation, compliance issues, and uncertainty.
3For example, Montero (2009) highlights these problems both within the U.S. sulfur permit market—
where 43% of permits allocations were allocated to just four players—as well as an international carbon
market, where strategic behavior may exist between countries. More recently, Hintermann (2015) provides
evidence of price manipulation in the EU-ETS.
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the potential to distort the equilibrium permit price, reduce the cost effectiveness of pol-
lution control, and influence the product market equilibrium. Although the existence
of market power and the associated losses may be significant, the fundamental aspects
of this problem—the interactions between players in the permit market—are not well
understood. In particular, very little is known about the formation of equilibria in the
permit market when all players behave strategically.
To address this problem, we derive a strategic market game (Shapley and Shubik,
1977) that takes into consideration strategic behavior in the permit market. Our model
comprises of two stages. In the first stage, traders participate in a strategic permit market
game. Traders in the permit market participate by submitting either an offer (of permits)
or bid (of money). A trading post then aggregates the offers and bids and determines the
price of permits in a way that clears the market. Trade is thus price mediated: whether
a trader wishes to buy or sell permits depends on their abatement technology and on
their conjecture of the price in the market, which is determined by their beliefs about
the market actions of other traders. In the second stage, once firms receive their final
allocation of permits from the permit market, they transact on the product market. We
provide alternative product market structures to assist in our investigation; namely, we
begin by allowing regulated firms to act as perfect competitors in the product market
then advance our analysis so that the firms act as independent monopolists, as well
as considering an oligopoly market structure. Industries regulated by cap-and-trade
markets are often highly concentrated (regionally segregated) markets, for example, this
has been evident in the electricity (Wolfram, 1999; Borenstein et al., 2002; Bushnell et al.,
2008) and cement (Ryan, 2012; Fowlie et al., 2016) industries. With such a framework, we
are thus interested in the structure and formation of equilibria in both the permit and
product markets when all firms act strategically. We focus our attention on the incentives
for players to trade, the overall cost effectiveness of regulation, and the equilibrium
structure of the markets.
In our price-mediated model of permit exchange we consider the existence of an
equilibrium with trade in permits, and demonstrate that the market equilibrium is al-
ways cost inefficient. Indeed, we find that even in the presence of gains from trade
autarky may be the only outcome if the gains from trade are not sufficiently large. Our
framework also shows that strategic trade can alter the structure of the market, as the
role of firms (buyers or sellers) and the equilibrium price are now endogenously deter-
mined: buyers (sellers) in a competitive market can switch their role in a market with
strategic trade. When firms place bids or offers in the permit market, they also take into
account future strategic product market behavior. A firm holding a permit not only has
a direct effect on reducing their abatement cost they will also experience an indirect effect
in which holding the permit will increase optimal production as well as the ability to
raise rivals’ costs.
The idea that firms attempt to manipulate the permit market price has long been
recognized. A vast literature has followed the contribution by Hahn (1984).4 In his
4See Montero (2009) and Reichenbach and Requate (2013) for comprehensive literature surveys on mar-
ket power in pollution markets. Using frameworks that model exhaustible resources, market power in
pollution markets has also been considered when pollution permits are storable (Liski and Montero, 2006,
2011).
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study, Hahn developed a permit market model with a single large trader and a price-
taking competitive fringe of small traders. This framework, however, is restrictive. These
traditional models exogenously impose a behavioral restriction on some agents: not all
agents are permitted to behave strategically and there is a requirement for an auctioneer.
Thus, models that assume a monopolist and a competitive fringe framework have some
peculiar features. In such models, for example, the competitive fringe ‘soaks up’ the
excess demand from the monopolist and as the size of the competitive fringe reduces,
trade ceases to take place. Aside from these peculiarities, the basic competitive fringe
framework remains popular and has been extended in a number of directions. First,
models have accounted for additional players that act as oligopolists competing against
each other in the presence of a competitive fringe.5 Yet precisely the same conclusion
holds (even though the oligopolists could effectively trade with each other). Second,
analysis has concentrated on establishing links between permit and product markets.
The work by Misiolek and Elder (1989) was the first to present a model where a domi-
nant firm can alter permit trades in order to manipulate rival firms’ costs in the product
market.6 Although the model provides a link between both a permit and product mar-
ket, the analysis suffers from the same weakness as other competitive fringe frameworks;
namely, behavioral assumptions are still required to allow only one firm to manipulate
the permit and product market. Thus, in general, these models are rather limited in de-
scribing how trade might take place in an economy populated by large firms in which
the assumption of a substantial competitive fringe is not appropriate. In order to pro-
vide insight to this problem, we must investigate strategic behavior from a different
perspective.
In this article we provide a new framework to investigate strategic behavior in a
permit market. We do this by using a strategic market game and provide a unifying
framework that incorporates strategic behavior for all firms in the permit market as
well as considering the impact of market power in the product market. To provide
a full equilibrium characterization, we follow a three-step approach that exploits the
aggregative properties of the game played. In Step 1, we hypothesize a permit price and
consider whether firms would be (potential) buyers or sellers of permits. In Step 2, we
consider the behavior of each side of the market separately at the hypothesized permit
price, deducing the aggregate supply of, and demand for, permits at that price. Finally,
in Step 3, we check whether the hypothesized permit price is consistent with aggregate
demand and supply. If so, then we have identified a Nash equilibrium. Once a permit
market equilibrium is determined, firms participate in the product market. We start by
providing a benchmark case of a perfectly competitive product market. We then develop
our framework to allow each firm to be an independent monopolist within their product
market as well as providing an oligopolistic product market structure. Allowing for
such an approach provides a comprehensive, realistic, and tractable structure to analyze
strategic trade in permit markets (and the associated product market).
5See, for example, Westskog (1996) and, more recently, Hagem (2013) that discusses the choice of strate-
gic behavior.
6See Salop and Scheffman (1983, 1987), and Rogerson (1984) for the underlying framework.
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1.1 Recent literature
To overcome the drawbacks of a competitive fringe framework, a small number of al-
ternative mechanisms have been advocated. These alternatives use the supply function
approach of Klemperer and Meyer (1989) to model trade in pollution permits (Malueg
and Yates, 2009; Wirl, 2009; Lange, 2012).7 Using this supply function approach iden-
tifies the losses associated with strategic behavior and shows that, although a bilateral
oligopoly leads to the same equilibrium permit price as the competitive solution, trading
volume is lower. In supply function frameworks, firms set up trade functions and spec-
ify the number of permits that are to be bought or sold, conditional on the equilibrium
price. The market maker then collects these schedules and determines a market-clearing
price. Although this approach does provide additional understanding of strategic per-
mit trade, the main disadvantage of using a supply function approach is that price de-
termination is a ‘black box’: the market maker determines the equilibrium price where
aggregate net trades are zero without any attempt to focus on a price-mediated solu-
tion.8 Establishing a price-mediated solution, therefore, may provide a richer (and more
plausible) approach to modeling strategic trade in permits—something we consider in
this article.
We provide a trading mechanism in a bilateral oligopoly framework that allows all
traders to behave strategically and in which the sides of the market (i.e., the sets of
buyers and sellers of permits) form endogenously, and is very much in the spirit of
price-mediated trade via quantity competition à la Cournot. As such, the model does
not take place in a ‘black box’ with a requirement for an auctioneer to clear the market,
instead, we outline an explicit price-formation mechanism. Our mechanism incorporates
a trading post that aggregates the bids and offers of all players and the equilibrium price
is determined via the ratio of total amount of money bid to the total number of permits
offered. Any exchanges are therefore determined subject to the bids and offers made as
well as the resulting permit market price.
We are able to directly compare our framework with the supply function literature.
In direct contrast to the key findings of this literature, we show the equilibrium permit
price in our model of bilateral oligopoly will generically be different to the competitive
equilibrium permit price. Under certain conditions, therefore, some firms may switch
between selling permits (in the competitive equilibrium) to buying permits (in the bi-
lateral oligopoly), and vice versa. Moreover, we show that for trade to take place it is
necessary that there are ‘sufficient’ gains from trade, meaning autarky is the only equi-
librium in some markets even though gains from trade may exist. By contrast, in supply
function models, autarky is only an equilibrium when the initial permit allocation is
efficient—something originally observed in Hahn (1984).
7For a further discussion see Godal (2011). For experimental findings of this approach see Schnier et al.
(2014).
8As noted by Malueg and Yates (2009), Wirl (2009), and Lange (2012), the method of obtaining unique-
ness in supply function equilibria requires additional assumptions over-and-above the requirement of un-
specified price determination. For example, Malueg and Yates (2009) requires that firms have identical
marginal abatement cost slopes as well as single parameter linear net-trade functions, whereas Lange
(2012) requires that all strategies are consistent with small (stochastic) changes in the demand functions.
As our approach focuses on an explicit trading mechanism, which produces a price-mediated solution, we
do not require any of these additional assumptions.
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In our general framework, we analyze firm behavior when the permit and product
markets are linked. In particular, we combine the strategic permit market with alterna-
tive product market structures.9 Earlier literature has also investigated the connectivity
between the permit and product market, but this has been framed through a traditional
competitive fringe framework (along with the subsequent weaknesses) (e.g., Sartze-
takis, 1997; Hintermann, 2011).10 Using our framework, we show that the introduction
of independent monopolists in the product market unambiguously lowers the equilib-
rium permit price as the strategic supply (demand) of permits increases (decreases).
When this product market structure is replaced by an oligopoly product market, coun-
terbalancing strategic effects occur such that there may be an increase in the demand for
permits and upward pressure on the associated permit price.
Our contribution is to provide a framework to model fully strategic trade in pollution
permits, that is both realistic and tractable to allow for the full equilibrium characteri-
zation of the permit market. This, then, provides a basis for the evaluation of contem-
porary cap-and-trade markets when strategic behavior exists for all market participants.
By combining our analysis with alternative product market structures, we also provide
an encompassing model that incorporates many current regulatory market structures.
Our approach can be used to nest previous attempts at strategic behavior in the product
market (e.g., Misiolek and Elder, 1989) as well as complementing the recent literature
on strategic permit markets that has yet to investigate the fundamental links between
permit and product markets (Malueg and Yates, 2009; Wirl, 2009; Lange, 2012).
This article is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the economic environment,
determines the equilibrium characterization of a strategic market game and product
market equilibrium. Section 3 provides a discussion of the permit market equilibrium.
Section 4 extends the framework to include strategic behavior in the product market.
We then conclude in Section 5.
2 The model
2.1 The economic environment
Consider an economic environment that is populated by an index set of firms I =
{1, . . . , N}, where firm i ∈ I has an initial stock of money mi ≥ 0. Firms operate in a
product market where the production of goods generates pollution. This pollution is
regulated by a cap-and-trade scheme. Firms have the option to either hold a permit to
cover emission liabilities, or reduce emissions by utilizing (costly) abatement technolo-
gies. Before undertaking production, firm i is allocated an initial endowment of permits
ωi > 0 with the opportunity to engage in permit trade.11 The regulator’s pollution
target is Ω = ∑i∈I ωi. We consider a two-stage environment: in the first stage permit
9Recently, Fowlie et al. (2016) investigated the adoption of market-based instruments (without market
power) on a highly concentrated product market (a regionally segregated cement industry). Fowlie et al.
(2016) finds that the establishment of a market-based instrument coupled with the market-power distortions
in the product market generate losses over-and-above any benefits associated with emissions mitigation.
See also Ryan (2012).
10For additional insights see De Feo et al. (2013).
11The analysis can also allow for traders who have no initial allocation of permits but that might want to
transact in the permit market.
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allocations are determined in the permit market which become common knowledge; in
the second stage firms make production decisions in the product market.
Let xi ∈ R be the number of permits that firm i is allocated by the market after
trading: xi > 0 for purchases of permits and xi < 0 for sales. Let x denote the vector
of final allocations for all firms, and x−i the vector of all allocations excluding that
of firm i. The final permit holdings of firm i are ωi + xi and we denote the price of
permits by p. In the product market firm i’s output is denoted by zi, and the product
price φ is determined by an inverse demand relationship Φ(Z), where Z = ∑i∈I zi is
the aggregate supply of the good. Production of the good generates pollution and the
quantity of pollution emitted in producing zi is given by fi(zi). Any pollution that is not
covered by a permit must be abated; accordingly, pollution abatement required by firm
i is ai ≡ fi(zi)− (ωi + xi). Firms undertaking production incur direct production costs
and pollution abatement costs, so firm i’s total cost of production is given by Ci(zi, ai).
Assumption. For each firm i ∈ I the functions fi(·) and Ci(·, ·) are twice continuously differ-
entiable; f ′i , f
′′
i ≥ 0; Czi , Cai ≥ 0 with a strict inequality if zi > 0; Czzi , Caai > 0 and Czai ≥ 0;
Czzi C
aa
i − (Czai )2 > 0; and finally Czi + f ′i Cai = 0 when zi = 0.
Firm i’s payoff is comprised of any initial wealth mi, revenue or costs associated with
permit market activity xi p, and, after accounting for all costs of production, the profit
from productive activity:
Vi = mi − xi p + ziφ− Ci(zi, fi(zi)− (ωi + xi)).
Once initial permit endowments have been set (which are common knowledge),
firms have the opportunity to trade permits and the market mechanism will determine
the final allocation of permits. To capture firms’ strategic behavior in the market for
pollution permits, we turn to a model of bilateral oligopoly with a market mechanism
in which market actions are quantity-based and trade is price mediated; no price-taking
assumptions are imposed ex ante and the role of firms as buyers or sellers of permits is
determined endogenously in the market. Such ‘strategic market games’ were introduced
by Shapley and Shubik (1977) to model fully strategic behavior in general equilibrium
settings, which we restrict to the case of two commodities—a good (permits) and money
(see Dickson and Hartley, 2008). Trade takes place by way of an explicit trading mecha-
nism: there is a ‘trading post’ to which firms submit an offer of permits to be exchanged
for money or a bid of money to be exchanged for permits, depending on whether they
want to sell or buy permits.12 The trading post aggregates the offers and bids of all
firms and determines the price of permits as the ratio of the total amount of money bid
to the total number of permits offered. Exchanges are then determined according to the
offers and bids made and the resulting market price. Trade is therefore price mediated,
and each individual firm considers that their actions influence this price. Whether a
firm wishes to buy or sell permits will depend on their abatement technology and their
belief about the price in the market.
12This is in contrast to the existing literature on strategic trade in pollution permits (e.g., Hahn, 1984;
Hintermann, 2011) that invariably assumes the presence of a ‘competitive fringe’ necessitating a ‘black box’
(auctioneer) approach to market clearing.
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Formally, firm i can make an offer of permits 0 ≤ qi ≤ ωi to be exchanged for
money, or make a bid of money 0 ≤ bi ≤ mi to be exchanged for permits.13 We assume
firms only buy permits from their initial money holdings and we rule out firms making
‘wash trades’, i.e., contemporaneously buying and selling permits. The set of strategies
available to firm i ∈ I is therefore
Si = {(bi, qi) : 0 ≤ bi ≤ mi, 0 ≤ qi ≤ ωi, bi · qi = 0}.
The role of the trading post is to aggregate the offers and bids and determine trades.
Let the aggregate offer and the aggregate bid be Q = ∑i∈I qi and B = ∑i∈I bi, respec-
tively. If either B or Q are zero then the trading post is deemed closed and any offers or
bids that are made are returned. So long as B, Q > 0, the price of permits (denominated
in units of money) is determined as p = B/Q, and the number of permits allocated to
firm i (in addition to their initial holdings) is given by
xi =
{
bi/p if bi > 0, qi = 0 or
−qi if qi > 0, bi = 0.
(1)
The change in firm i’s money holdings is thus
−xi p =
{
−bi if bi > 0, qi = 0 or
qi p if qi > 0, bi = 0.
An intuitive interpretation of this mechanism is as follows: the total supply of permits
to the market from those that want to sell (Q) is shared among those traders that want
to buy in proportion to their bids (bi/B), for which a per-unit price of p is transferred to
the sellers.
Once permit trading has taken place, permit allocations become common knowledge
and firms engage in production decisions in the product market. In our baseline model
we assume that firms behave as price-takers in the product market by modeling it as a
perfectly competitive market. Later in the article, we explore the implications of firms
having market power in the product market.
2.2 Product market decisions
Let φ denote the product market price that is set by the Walrasian auctioneer in a per-
fectly competitive product market. Then the profit of a typical firm i ∈ I from their
product market activity is
p˜ii(zi; xi) = ziφ− Ci(zi, fi(zi)− (ωi + xi)).
Once the permit market has cleared and firm i has a permit allocation xi, the product
market profit function p˜ii(zi; xi) depends only on zi. Firm i ∈ I will seek to choose zi to
13Throughout it is assumed that a sufficiently large penalty can be levied on firms for offering more
permits than are in their possession, or making bids that exceed their money holdings, that this will never
constitute equilibrium behavior. For example, this occurs with the non-compliance penalty in the EU-ETS,
which was set at e100 per tonne of CO2 in 2013 and increases with the Eurozone inflation rate: significantly
higher than the equilibrium permit price.
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maximize p˜ii(zi; xi), where the first-order condition is
dp˜ii(zi; xi)
dzi
≤ 0⇔ Czi (zi, fi(zi)− (ωi + xi)) + f ′i (zi)Cai (zi, fi(zi)− (ωi + xi)) ≥ φ, (2)
with equality if zi > 0.14 Since we assume Czi + f
′
i C
a
i = 0 when zi = 0 the solution will
always be interior where the first-order condition holds with equality, and we denote
the solution to (2) by z˜i(φ; xi) > 0.
The competitive equilibrium product price determined by the Walrasian auctioneer
must satisfy φ˜ = Φ(∑ni=1 z˜i(φ˜; xi)). This, of course, depends on the distribution of permit
allocations, so where appropriate we will write φ˜(x) as the solution to this equation.15
With a slight abuse of notation we write z˜i(xi) for the supply of firm i to the product
market in the competitive equilibrium, which is derived by firms equating their ‘overall
marginal cost’—comprised of the marginal cost of production and abatement—to the
price of the good.
The relationship between a firm’s behavior in the product market and their actions
in the permit market is given by
dz˜i(xi)
dsi
=
dz˜i(xi)
dxi
dxi
dsi
, for s = {b, q}, (3)
which follows by virtue of firm i’s product market strategy depending only on its own
allocation of permits. Implicit differentiation of (2) yields
dz˜i(xi)
dxi
=
Czai + C
aa
i f
′
i
Czzi + 2C
za
i f
′
i + C
aa
i ( f
′
i )
2 + Cai f
′′
i
> 0 (4)
under our assumptions. Intuitively, if a firm acquires more permits in the permit market
then less abatement is required for a given level of output. This has two effects relevant
for product market decisions: since Caai > 0 the marginal cost of abatement falls; and
since Czai > 0 the marginal cost of production falls. Both effects work to favor an increase
in product market output when the firm is in possession of more permits.
To understand the effect of a change in the permit allocation on a firm’s profitability
in the product market let us, again with a slight abuse of notation, write the optimized
profit function in the product market as
p˜ii(xi) = z˜i(xi)φ˜− Ci(z˜i(xi), fi(z˜i(xi))− (ωi + xi)). (5)
Since this is only influenced by xi, we can write
dp˜ii(xi)
dsi
=
dp˜ii(xi)
dxi
dxi
dsi
, (6)
14This first-order condition is both necessary and sufficient under the assumptions stated in Subsection
2.1; the second-order condition is −Czzi − Caai ( f ′i )2 − 2Czai f ′i − Cai f ′′i < 0.
15Note that since firms are assumed to be price-takers in the product market no firm takes into consider-
ation the effect of their permit allocation on the product price.
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in which
dp˜ii(xi)
dxi
=
dz˜i(xi)
dxi
[φ˜− Czi − Cai f ′i ] + Cai
= Cai (z˜i(xi), fi(z˜i(xi))− (ωi + xi))
(7)
as the first-order condition (2) implies φ˜− Czi − Cai f ′i = 0. Equations (6) and (7) show a
direct link between the permit and product markets: this will be used to investigate the
firm’s actions within the permit market.
2.3 Permit market equilibrium
Foreseeing the consequences of permit market activity on actions in the product market,
each firm i ∈ I can be seen as solving the problem
max
(bi ,qi)∈Si
mi − xi p + p˜ii(xi),
where xi = bi/p− qi, p = B/Q, and p˜ii is defined in (5). This problem is concave in both
bi and qi so the first-order conditions are both necessary and sufficient in identifying a
best response.16
When engaging in permit market activity, a firm affects its product market prof-
itability (according to (6)) and also its expenditure in the permit market. When choosing
s = {b, q} ∈ Si the firm will balance the marginal change in product market profitability
with the marginal change in permit market expenditure, so that
dp˜ii(xi)
dxi
dxi
dsi
≤ dxi p
dsi
, s = {b, q},
where the inequality is replaced with an equality if si > 0.
For a buyer of permits for whom s = b, xi = bi/p, and so it follows that
dxi
dsi
=
(1− bi/B)p−1 and dxi pdsi = 1. As such, the first-order condition for a buyer of permits is
dp˜ii(bi/p)
dxi
≤ (1− bi/B)−1 p, (8)
where the inequality is replaced with an equality if bi > 0.
For a seller of permits for whom s = q, xi = −qi and we have dxidsi = −1 and
dxi p
dsi
= −(1− qi/Q)p. Consequently, the first-order condition is
dp˜ii(−qi)
dxi
≥ (1− qi/Q)p, (9)
with equality if qi > 0.
16This follows by noting that for s = {b, q}, the first derivative of the payoff function is − dxi pdsi +
dp˜ii(xi)
dxi
dxi
dsi
and so the second derivative is − d2xi pds2i +
d2p˜ii(xi)
dx2i
(
dxi
dsi
)2
+ dp˜ii(xi)dxi
d2xi
ds2i
. When s = b: xi = (bi/B)Q so
dxi
dbi
= B−biB2 Q and
d2xi
ds2i
= − 2(B−bi)B3 Q; and xi p = bi so
d2xi p
db2i
= 0. When s = q: xi = −qi so d
2xi
dq2i
= 0; and
xi p = −(qi/Q)B so dxi pdqi = −
Q−qi
Q2 B and
d2xi p
dq2i
= +
2(Q−qi)
Q3 B. As noted,
dp˜ii(xi)
dxi
> 0 and we will subsequently
show in Lemma 1 that d
2p˜ii
dx2i
< 0, which establishes the claim.
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Since firms are heterogeneous in their cost structure, pursuing a standard best-
response analysis of this game would be fruitless as the dimensionality of the problem
makes it intractable. Rather than imposing additional assumptions to instil tractability
(e.g., restricting firms to be one of two types), we follow an approach—first presented
in Dickson and Hartley (2008) and later extended to the case of ‘interior endowments’
by Dickson and Hartley (2013)—that exploits the fact that firms’ payoffs depend only on
their own action and the aggregation of other firms’ actions in B and Q, which them-
selves influence the price p. Here we present the reasoning for permit exchange coupled
with subsequent product market decisions. The method allows the construction of sup-
ply and demand functions in the permit market that account for strategic behavior and
endogenous formation of the sides of the market, and can be used to identify a permit
market equilibrium. The method proceeds as follows.
Step 1: Hypothesize a permit price p, and consider which firms would act on each side
of the permit market if there was a Nash equilibrium with this price. We define
p˜∗i ≡ Cai (z˜i(0), fi(z˜i(0))−ωi) (10)
as firm i’s marginal abatement cost at its initial endowment and will show (in
Proposition 2) that firm i will be a buyer of permits only if p˜∗i > p and a seller of
permits only if p˜∗i < p. When considering behavior consistent with a price p, this
allows us to separate the set of firms into those that will potentially buy permits,
and those that will potentially sell.
Step 2a: Hypothesize an aggregate supply of permits, Q, and consider the individual
supplies of those firms that might sell permits at price p that are consistent with
a Nash equilibrium with this Q and p. Then ask whether firms’ individual sup-
plies are consistent when aggregated, i.e., that individual supplies aggregate to Q.
Let q˜i(p; Q) denote firm i’s supply consistent with a Nash equilibrium in which
the aggregate supply is Q and the price is p (which is given by the minimum
of either the qi that solves (9) or ωi). Then we seek the value of Q such that
∑{i∈I:p∗i <p} q˜i(p; Q) = Q, which is the aggregate supply consistent with a Nash
equilibrium in which the price is p.
Step 2b: Hypothesize an aggregate bid B from those firms that might buy permits at
price p, and deduce individual bids consistent with this aggregate bid, which
we denote b˜i(p; B) (this is given by the minimum of either the bi that solves (8)
or mi). Seek consistency of the aggregate bid, i.e., find the value of B such that
∑{i∈I:p∗i >p} b˜i(p; B) = B.
Step 3: Seek a consistent price, i.e., a price such that the consistent aggregate offer from
Step 2a and bid from Step 2b satisfy B/Q = p, which identifies a Nash equilibrium.
We begin by establishing Step 1. To do so, we first require the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For each firm i ∈ I, d2p˜ii(xi)dx2i < 0.
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Proof. Recall from (7) that dp˜ii(xi)dxi = C
a
i (z˜i(xi), fi(z˜i(xi))− (ωi + xi)). As such,
d2p˜ii(xi)
dx2i
= Czai
dz˜i(xi)
dxi
+ Caai
(
f ′i
dz˜i(xi)
dxi
− 1
)
=
dz˜i(xi)
dxi
(Czai + C
aa
i f
′
i )− Caai .
In (4) we deduced that dz˜i(xi)dxi =
Czai +C
aa
i f
′
i
Czzi +2C
za
i f
′
i +C
aa
i ( f
′
i )
2+Cai f
′′
i
, implying
d2p˜ii(xi)
dx2i
=
(Czai + C
aa
i f
′
i )
2
Czzi + 2C
za
i f
′
i + C
aa
i ( f
′
i )
2 + Cai f
′′
i
− Caai
=
(Czai )
2 − Czzi Caai − Cai Caai f ′′i
Czzi + 2C
za
i f
′
i + C
aa
i ( f
′
i )
2 + Cai f
′′
i
,
which is negative as a result of our assumptions on cost and pollution generation func-
tions.
We are now in a position to complete Step 1. The following proposition allows us to
understand, once a permit price has been hypothesized, how firms are determined as
either buyers or sellers of permits.17
Proposition 2. If there is a Nash equilibrium with price p then firm i ∈ I will be a buyer (seller)
of permits only if p˜∗i > (<)p.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let p˜∗i > p and assume, by contradiction, that i sells permits. Then
qi > 0 and xi = −qi < 0, so Lemma 1 implies dp˜ii(xi)dxi >
dp˜ii(xi)
dxi
∣∣∣
xi=0
≡ p˜∗i (see (10)).
But from the first-order condition for sellers, dp˜ii(xi)dxi = (1 − qi/Q)p < p. As such,
p˜∗i <
dp˜ii(xi)
dxi
< p, yielding a contradiction. Thus, if p˜∗i > p for firm i then this firm will
only buy permits in equilibrium. Demonstrating that if p˜∗i < p then firm i will only sell
permits is similar and so omitted.
Operationally, the consistent behavior of firms is represented using share functions.
Take a typical firm i. If p > p˜∗i then we know that the firm will only be a seller of permits
at such prices and we consider their behavior consistent with a Nash equilibrium in
which the permit price is p and the aggregate supply of all ‘potential sellers’ (those
firms j 6= i ∈ I for whom p > p˜∗j ) is Q > 0. Let σi = qi/Q be firm i’s share of the total
supply; then using (9) we can deduce that firm i’s optimal share of the total supply is
given by its ‘selling share function’ s˜Si (p; Q) = min{σi,ωi/Q} where σi is the solution to
l˜Si (σi, Q, p) ≡
dp˜ii(−σiQ)
dxi
− (1− σi)p ≥ 0, (11)
with equality if σi > 0.
It is useful to ascertain the properties of share functions. The share function s˜Si (p; Q)
is implicitly defined, and implicit differentiation of (11) reveals that it is decreasing in
17This is similar to Dickson and Hartley (2013, Lemma 1), but is included here for the case of permit
exchange for a self-contained treatment.
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Q and non-decreasing in p; in addition, study of (11) reveals that limQ→0 s˜Si (p; Q) =
1− p˜∗ip .18
Consider now the case where p < p˜∗i : firm i will only be a buyer of permits. The be-
havior of firm i consistent with a Nash equilibrium in which the price is p and the aggre-
gate bid is B > 0 is represented by its ‘buying share function’ s˜Bi (p; B) = min{σi, mi/B}
where, using (8), σi is the solution to
l˜Bi (σi, B, p) ≡
dp˜ii(σiB/p)
dxi
− (1− σi)−1 p ≤ 0, (12)
with equality if σi > 0.
To deduce the properties of a buyer’s share function, we note that if the aggregate
bid is B and the price is p, the implied demand is B/p; thus, we write firm i’s share
function as s˜Bi (p, [B/p]p). Implicit differentiation of (12) reveals that the share function
is strictly decreasing in [B/p] for fixed p, strictly decreasing in p for fixed [B/p], and
has the property lim[B/p]→0 s˜Bi (p; B) = 1− pp˜∗i .
19
These share functions represent each firm’s consistent behavior at a particular price,
with particular aggregate bids or offers. We now seek consistency of these aggregates to
complete Steps 2a and 2b above. Consistency of the aggregate offer at price p requires
the sum of the individual offers of all firms that wish to sell at price p to be equal to the
aggregate offer, or, dividing both sides of this equation by Q, for the sum of the share
functions to be equal to one. Define S˜S(p; Q) ≡ ∑{i∈I: p˜∗i <p} s˜Si (p; Q). Then at price p we
identify the strategic supply, denoted by Q˜(p), as that level of Q where
S˜S(p; Q) = 1. (13)
For a given p, all firms for whom p˜∗i < p will be included in S˜
S(p; Q) and since each
s˜Si (p; Q) is continuous and decreasing in Q, S˜
S(p; Q) will inherit this property implying
Q˜(p), where defined, is a function. When p changes, the share functions of those firms
who remain sellers change in a smooth way, and those firms who become sellers as the
price rises (or drop out of the set of sellers as the price falls) again do so in a smooth way,
implying that S˜S(p; Q) is continuous in p and consequently Q˜(p) varies continuously
in p. Moreover, consideration of the equation implicitly defining Q˜(p) reveals it is non-
decreasing in p.20 The range of prices for which Q˜(p) is defined is p > P˜S, where P˜S is
18Recall from Lemma 1 that d
2p˜ii(xi)
dx2i
< 0. As such, ∂l˜
S
i (σi ,Q,p)
∂σi
= −Q d2p˜ii(xi)dx2i + p > 0 so there is at most
one solution to li(σi, Q, p) = 0: s˜Si (p; Q) is a function. Moreover, implicit differentiation of (11) gives
∂s˜Si (p;Q)
∂Q = −
∂l˜Si (σi ,Q,p)
∂Q
∂l˜Si (σi ,Q,p)
∂σi
= −
−σi d
2 p˜ii (xi )
dx2i
−Q d2 p˜ii (xi )
dx2i
+p
< 0 and ∂s˜
S
i (p;Q)
∂p = −
∂l˜Si (σi ,Q,p)
∂p
∂l˜Si (σi ,Q,p)
∂σi
= − −(1−σi)
−Q d2 p˜ii (xi )
dx2i
+p
> 0.
19The fact that d
2p˜ii(xi)
dx2i
< 0 (Lemma 1) is again important. With this in mind, note that ∂l˜
B
i (σi ,B,p)
∂σi
=
B/p d
2p˜ii(xi)
dx2i
− (1− σi)−2 < 0, so we are ensured s˜Bi (p; B) is a function. Undertaking implicit differentia-
tion, ∂s˜
B
i (p;[B/p]p)
∂[B/p] = −
∂l˜Bi (σi ,[B/p]p,p)
∂[B/p]
∂l˜Bi (σi ,[B/p]p,p)
∂σi
= −
σi
d2 p˜ii (xi )
dx2i
B/p d
2 p˜ii (xi )
dx2i
−(1−σi)−2
< 0. In addition, ∂s˜
B
i (p;[B/p]p)
∂p = −
∂l˜Bi (σi ,[B/p]p,p)
∂p
∂l˜Bi (σi ,[B/p]p,p)
∂σi
=
(1−σi)−1
B/p d
2 p˜ii (xi )
dx2i
−(1−σi)−2
< 0. The limit is a consequence of taking limits in (12) as [B/p]→ 0.
20Although ∑{i∈I: p˜∗i <p} s˜
S
i (p; Q) is continuous in p, it is not differentiable at values of p where new firms
enter the set of sellers so implicit differentiation cannot be used. Rather, suppose by contradiction that for
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uniquely defined by the equation
∑
{i∈I: p˜∗i <P˜S}
1− p˜
∗
i
P˜S
= 1. (14)
For p ≤ P˜S, the aggregate share function S˜S(p; Q) takes a value less than one when Q
is close to zero and, since it is decreasing in Q, this is also true for higher values of Q;
accordingly, it is never equal to one. Conversely, for p > P˜S it exceeds one when Q is
small enough and since it is continuous and decreasing in Q it is equal to one at exactly
one value of Q: the strategic supply.
On the buyers’ side, we seek to find the consistent level of [B/p], which is the aggre-
gate demand for permits. This requires that individual bids when aggregated exactly
equal the aggregate bid B, or that the sum of share functions equals one. Defining
S˜B(p; [B/p]p) ≡ ∑{i∈I: p˜∗i >p} s˜Bi (p; [B/p]p), the strategic demand for permits, denoted by
D˜(p), is that level of [B/p] which satisfies
S˜B(p; [B/p]p) = 1. (15)
Continuity of the strategic demand function follows by similar deductions to those
made for strategic supply, and study of the condition implicitly defining strategic de-
mand allows us to deduce that strategic demand is decreasing (strictly) in p.21 The
range of prices for which D˜(p) is defined is p < P˜B, where P˜B is uniquely defined by
the equation
∑
{i∈I: p˜∗i >P˜B}
1− P˜
B
p˜∗i
= 1. (16)
For reasons that are similar to those elucidated for strategic supply, if p ≥ P˜B then
the aggregate share function is less than one for all values of [B/p] so for these prices
strategic demand is undefined whereas it takes positive values for p < P˜B.
Turning finally to Step 3, a permit price p is consistent with a Nash equilibrium
in which trade in permits takes place if and only if strategic supply and demand are
equal at that price, for only then will the aggregate offer of permits and bid of money
be consistent with the price. Since strategic demand is strictly decreasing in p and
strategic supply is non-decreasing in p, if strategic supply and demand cross they do
so only once, implying that there is at most one Nash equilibrium in which trade in
permits takes place. This will be the case so long as P˜S < P˜B. Under such circumstances
p′ > p we have Q˜(p′) < Q˜(p). Then the fact that share functions are decreasing in Q and non-decreasing
in p implies
1 = ∑
{i∈I: p˜∗i <p}
s˜Si (p; Q˜(p)) ≤ ∑
{i∈I: p˜∗i <p′}
s˜Si (p; Q˜(p)) < ∑
{i∈I: p˜∗i <p′}
s˜Si (p
′; Q˜(p′)) = 1,
a contradiction.
21Suppose by contradiction that p′ > p and D˜(p′) ≥ D˜(p). Then the facts previously deduced that the
share function is strictly decreasing in p (and [B/p]) implies
1 = ∑
{i∈I: p˜∗i >p}
s˜Bi (p; D˜(p)p) ≤ ∑
{i∈I: p˜∗i >p′}
s˜Bi (p; D˜(p)p) < ∑
{i∈I: p˜∗i >p′}
s˜Bi (p
′; D˜(p′)p′) = 1,
a contradiction.
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let pˆ be the equilibrium price at which Q˜( pˆ) = D˜( pˆ) then the equilibrium aggregate
supply of permits to the market is Qˆ = Q˜( pˆ); the equilibrium aggregate bid of money
is Bˆ = pˆQˆ; the equilibrium supply of each firm for whom p˜∗i < pˆ is qˆi = Qˆs˜
S
i ( pˆ; Qˆ) and
the equilibrium bid of each firm for whom p˜∗i > pˆ is bˆi = Bˆs˜
B
i ( pˆ; Bˆ). Equilibrium permit
allocations are xˆi = bˆi/ pˆ− qˆi. If P˜S ≥ P˜B then there is no Nash equilibrium in which
trade in permits takes place; in such circumstances the only Nash equilibrium is autarky
(which is always an equilibrium in bilateral oligopoly) and each firm’s final allocation
of permits is their initial endowment.22
3 Features of the permit market equilibrium
With our framework established in the previous section, it is pertinent to consider fea-
tures of the permit market equilibrium and the consequences of strategic behavior. In
particular within this section we will focus on the existence, structure, and cost effective-
ness of the permit market equilibrium as well as the comparative statics of the model.
3.1 Existence of equilibrium
In bilateral oligopoly, as just noted, there is always an autarkic Nash equilibrium in
which no trade takes place. An important question is whether it is the only equilibrium.
The existence of a non-autarkic Nash equilibrium—and therefore whether any trade takes
place—in the market for permits hinges on whether P˜S defined in (14) is less than P˜B
defined in (16). To better understand the relationship between these two objects we next
elucidate the details of their construction. Recall that p˜∗i ≡ Cai (z˜i(0), fi(z˜i(0)) − ωi) is
firm i’s marginal abatement cost with its initial endowment of permits. Given an initial
distribution of permit endowments we can, without loss of generality, re-order firms
according to the magnitude of their marginal abatement cost: p˜∗1 ≤ p˜∗2 ≤ · · · ≤ p˜∗N . Now
we construct two functions that each depend on p. The first function, that identifies P˜S,
is
∑
{i∈I: p˜∗i <p}
1− p˜
∗
i
p
, (17)
which is increasing in p. For p ≤ p˜∗1 the function is undefined; for p˜∗1 < p ≤ p˜∗2 it takes
the value 1− p˜∗1p ; for p˜∗2 < p ≤ p˜∗3 it takes the value 2− p˜
∗
1+ p˜
∗
2
p ; for p˜
∗
n < p ≤ p˜∗n+1 it takes
the value n− ∑ni=1 p˜∗ip . The second function, which will identify P˜B, is
∑
{i∈I: p˜∗i >p}
1− p
p˜∗i
, (18)
which is decreasing in p and piecewise linear. Working from large values of p to smaller
values, for p ≥ p∗N the function is undefined; for p˜∗N−1 ≤ p < p˜∗N it takes the value 1− pp˜∗N ;
for p˜∗N−2 ≤ p < p˜∗N−1 it takes the value 2− pp˜∗N −
p
p˜∗N−1
; and for p˜∗N−n ≤ p < p˜∗N−n+1 it
takes the value n−∑Ni=N−n+1 pp˜∗i .
22It is readily verified by inspection of payoffs that if the bids and offers of all other firms are zero then
any positive bid or offer gives a lower payoff than being inactive, making autarky a Nash equilibrium.
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1
p˜∗NP˜Bp˜∗1 P˜S
p
R
1
p˜∗NP˜Bp˜∗1 P˜S
Figure 1: The construction of P˜S and P˜B. The upward-sloping functions are ∑{i∈I: p˜∗i <p} 1−
p˜∗i
p ,
which identifies P˜S, and the downward-sloping functions, which identify P˜B, are ∑{i∈I: p˜∗i >p} 1−p
p˜∗i
.
P˜S is identified by the value of p where (17) is equal to one; P˜B is given by the
value of p where (18) is equal to one. Figure 1 plots these functions for two different
economies. In the upper panel the p˜∗i s are widely dispersed and it is clear that in this
case P˜S < P˜B and therefore a non-autarkic Nash equilibrium in which trade in permits
takes place exists in this economy. In the lower panel, however, the p˜∗i s are less dispersed
and in this case P˜S > P˜B, so the only equilibrium here involves no trade in permits.
The dispersion of the p˜∗i s measures the gains from trading permits: if they are all
equal there are no gains from trade and as they become more dispersed the gains from
trade increase. As our illustration makes clear, the existence of gains from trade is not
sufficient to ensure trade will take place: p˜∗1 < p˜
∗
N does not imply P˜
S < P˜B. Rather, for
a non-autarkic permit market equilibrium to exist there must be ‘sufficient’ gains from
trading permits.
3.2 Cost efficiency of equilibrium
If a non-autarkic equilibrium does exist (i.e., the economy is such that P˜S < P˜B) will
this equilibrium reduce pollution levels to Ω in a cost-effective way? If we were willing
to assume that firms act as price-takers then the standard Walrasian equilibrium of the
permit market would be used to describe equilibrium. Well-known results tell us that at
the Walrasian equilibrium marginal abatement costs will be equalized; thus, whenever
gains from trade in permits exist trade will take place, and emission reductions will be
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achieved in a cost-effective manner (Montgomery, 1972). In our model, consider two
firms i and j that are active in a non-autarkic equilibrium with permit price pˆ, where i
is a seller of permits (p˜∗i < pˆ) and j is a buyer of permits (p˜
∗
j > pˆ). Then it follows from
(8) and (9) that
(1− σˆi)−1Cai (z˜i(xˆi), fi(z˜i(xˆi))− (ωi + xˆi)) = pˆ = (1− σˆj)Caj (z˜j(xˆj), f j(z˜j(xˆj))− (ωj + xˆj)).
(19)
From (19), the following proposition is immediate.
Proposition 3. In any permit market equilibrium in which trade takes place there exist i, j ∈ I
for whom
Cai (z˜i(xˆi), fi(z˜i(xˆi))− (ωi + xˆi)) < Caj (z˜j(xˆj), f j(z˜j(xˆj))− (ωj + xˆj)),
so emissions reductions are not achieved in a cost-effective manner, unless all firms are negligible
(so σˆi ≈ 0 for all i ∈ I).
This implies that between any buyer and seller (with non-negligible market share),
further cost reductions are possible by transferring more permits from the seller to the
buyer. All firms in bilateral oligopoly behave strategically; those that sell permits will
restrict supply to try to increase the price, those that buy will restrict their bids to put
downward pressure on the price. These strategic tensions combine to result in generic
inefficiencies in the final allocation of permits.
3.3 Structure of the market
In the permit trading model developed in this article the sides of the market form en-
dogenously: whether a firm becomes a seller or buyer of permits in equilibrium de-
pends on their marginal abatement cost at their endowment in relation to the permit
price, which depends on the actions of all firms. Since there is nothing in our model
to suggest that the permit price will be the same with strategic behavior as with price-
taking firms in a Walrasian model of permit exchange, prima facie it is unclear whether
firms will take the same role as seller or buyer in these two market structures.
Proposition 4. Suppose P˜S < P˜B so there is a permit market equilibrium with trade. Let pW be
the price of permits in a competitive market, and suppose that in the permit market equilibrium
pˆ < [>]pW and there is a firm i for whom pˆ < p˜∗i < p
W [pˆ > p∗i > p
W]. Then in a competitive
market firm i would be a seller [buyer], but when firms are modeled as behaving strategically the
same firm, if active, is on the opposite side of the market.
Proof. Let pˆ < p˜∗i < p
W . If firm i was a buyer in a competitive market then xi > 0
and Cai (z˜i(xi), fi(z˜i(xi)) − (ωi − xi)) = pW . But the fact that d
2p˜ii(xi)
dx2i
< 0 (Lemma 1)
implies that p˜∗i ≡ Cai (z˜i(0), fi(z˜i(0)) − ωi) > Cai (z˜i(xi), fi(z˜i(xi)) − (ωi − xi)) = pW , a
contradiction. Thus, in a competitive market, firm i is a seller. In a strategic market, if
firm i is also a seller then xi < 0 and Cai (z˜i(xi), fi(z˜i(xi))− (ωi − xi)) = (1− σˆi) pˆ. But
then Lemma 1 again implies Cai (z˜i(0), fi(z˜i(0))− ωi) < Cai (z˜i(xi), fi(z˜i(xi))− (ωi − xi))
so we have the inequality p˜∗i < (1− σˆi) pˆ < pˆ, a contradiction. The proof of the case
pˆ > p˜∗i > p
W is similar and so omitted.
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Malueg and Yates (2009) present a competing model of fully strategic trade in per-
mits that relies on the supply function approach of Klemperer and Meyer (1989). Al-
though their focus is on the role of private information in permit markets, to ensure
tractability of the model they must restrict supply functions to be linear. This has the
consequence that, regardless of the distribution of market power, the equilibrium price
will be equivalent to the competitive permit price (their Proposition 1). The equiva-
lence of the equilibrium price between a strategic framework and a perfectly competitive
framework, regardless of the distribution of market power, is a rather unrealistic feature
of the supply function approach. In our bilateral oligopoly framework, the equilibrium
price under strategic behavior is only equal to the competitive price if there is a perfect
balance in strategic manipulation between both sides of the market, which, generically,
will not be the case.
3.4 Comparative statics
As observed throughout this article, a number of fundamentals determine how firms
trade permits: firms’ endowments; their production (and abatement) technologies; as
well as the demand in the goods market. We now consider the influence of these features
on the permit market equilibrium.
Recall that the equilibrium in the permit market is identified by the intersection of the
strategic supply and demand functions, the construction of which relies on aggregating
firms’ share functions defined in (11) and (12). A merit of the approach is that the
properties of these share functions are relatively straightforward to deduce, allowing a
comparative static analysis of equilibrium.
A firm’s ‘selling share function’ is determined by the first-order condition dp˜ii(−σiQ)dxi −
(1− σi)p = 0, the left-hand side of which is increasing in σi (by Lemma 1). As such,
anything that increases [decreases] dp˜ii(−σiQ)dxi will decrease [increase] the share function.
Also note that strategic supply is determined by ∑{i∈I: p˜∗i <p} s
S
i (p; Q) = 1, the left-hand
side of which is decreasing in Q. Consequently, if a firm’s selling share function de-
creases [increases] then, other things equal, strategic supply will decrease [increase], for
the range of prices where this firm would be a seller.
A similar rationale can be made for buyers’ share functions. A firm’s ‘buying share
function’ is determined by dp˜ii(σi B/p)dxi − (1 − σ)−1 p = 0, the left-hand side of which
is decreasing in σi. Thus anything that increases [decreases]
dp˜ii(σi B/p)
dxi
will increase
[decrease] the share function. Again recall that strategic demand is determined by
∑{i∈I: p˜∗i >p} s
B
i (p, [B/p]p) = 1, the left-hand side of which is decreasing in [B/p]. It fol-
lows that if a firm’s buying share function increases [decreases] then strategic demand
will increase [decrease], over the range of prices where this firm would be a buyer.
Now, from (7) we know that dp˜ii(xi)dxi = C
a
i (z˜i(xi), fi(z˜i(xi))− (ωi + xi)). Our assump-
tions on firms’ cost functions then implies that dp˜ii(xi)dxi will increase [decrease] if (a) there
is an increase [decrease] in demand in the product market that results in z˜i(xi) increas-
ing [decreasing] for all xi; (b) the pollution generated from a given level of production
increases [decreases], where a reduction may be due to, for example, improvements in
abatement technology; and (c) the firm’s permit allocation decreases [increases].
Consider a situation, then, where demand increases in the product market, which
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influences all firms. Each firm’s selling share function will decrease, which decreases the
strategic supply of permits, and each firm’s buying share function will increase, which
increases the strategic demand for permits (recall that strategic supply is an increasing
function of p, and strategic demand is strictly decreasing in p). Consequently, an in-
crease in demand in the product market increases the equilibrium price of permits. The
effect on the equilibrium volume of permits traded is unclear since, while supply has
contracted, the permit price has increased.
Consider next a situation where abatement technologies become more efficient so
less pollution is generated from the production of goods and suppose this influences all
firms equally. Then selling share functions will decrease, which will result in an increase
in the strategic supply of permits, and buying share functions will decrease resulting
in a reduction in strategic demand for permits. The effect of more efficient abatement
technologies is to reduce the equilibrium price of permits, but the effect on the quantity
of permits traded is unclear.
If the regulator wishes to reduce total emissions Ω, which it implements by reducing
the endowment of all firms, then the effect is to decrease all firms’ selling share func-
tions which reduces strategic supply, and increase their buying share functions which
increases strategic demand. The consequence will be upward pressure on the equilib-
rium price of permits. Note, however, that changes in permit endowments are often not
undertaken in a uniform way. For example, we may consider a situation where a reg-
ulator changes policy from an equitable distribution of permits to a distribution where
more highly polluting firms receive more permits. Suppose that with an equitable dis-
tribution of permits the equilibrium price is pˆ and suppose further that the regulator
increases the endowment of permits to those who are buyers (i.e., for whom p˜∗i > pˆ)
and reduces the endowment of permits to sellers (i.e., those firms for whom p˜∗i < pˆ).
For those firms that received a greater [smaller] endowment, their buying share func-
tion reduces [increases] and their selling share function increases [reduces], with the
necessary implication that for all p ≥ pˆ strategic demand is lowered and, likewise, for
all p ≤ pˆ strategic supply is also lowered. Consequently, the equilibrium quantity of
permits traded will decline under the new regulation. In fact it is even possible that
under an equitable distribution of permits where P˜S < P˜B, a change to the initial en-
dowment towards a ‘grandfathered’ distribution of permits contracts both the strategic
supply and demand enough to make P˜S ≥ P˜B, so no trade in permits takes place: refer-
ring back to Figure 1, grandfathering may shift the economy from a situation depicted
in the upper panel, to that depicted in the lower panel.23 The effect on the equilibrium
permit price when there remains a non-autarkic equilibrium is unclear, and even if the
aggregate endowment of permits declines it does not necessarily follow that the permit
price will increase.
23Note that if a firm’s p˜∗i under an egalitarian distribution of permits is low then it will increase under
grandfathering, whereas if p˜∗i is high it will decrease under grandfathering, thus reducing the gains from
trade.
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4 Market power in the product market
We now turn to consider non-competitive product market structures and the effect on
the permit market equilibrium. In the previous framework it was assumed that firms
were price-takers in the product market; yet it is possible that some element of market
power may exist. This is, in fact, quite likely as many industries regulated by a cap-and-
trade scheme are highly concentrated, such as the electricity market (Wolfram, 1999;
Borenstein et al., 2002; Bushnell et al., 2008) and the cement industry (Ryan, 2012; Fowlie
et al., 2016). The manifestation of market power in a product market is the restriction
of supply to increase the price. We deduced in our comparative statics exercise that
there is a positive relationship between firms’ supply in the product market and their
net demand for permits, and therefore with the equilibrium permit price. As such, if
firms have market power in the product market and the supply of goods to the market
reduces, the ‘market-power effect’ will put downward pressure on permit prices relative
to the situation where firms are assumed to be price takers. If firms are independent
monopolists in the product market—which would be the case if the output of their
production process was sufficiently differentiated, or firms served regional markets—
then the market-power effect is the only additional consideration, the details of which
we elucidate in the next subsection. After this we consider the issues associated with
imperfect competition in a product market, where the strategic importance of a firm’s
cost function (in relation its competitors) provides a richer link between the product and
permit markets.
4.1 Independent monopolists
Consider a situation in which firms serve independent monopolies following the con-
clusion of the permit market: firms have market power in the product market, but there
is no strategic interaction. This structure may occur, for example, when electricity com-
panies participate in a permit market and are subsequent natural monopolists for their
electricity supply (e.g., Ellerman et al., 2000).
To begin, let Φ¯i(zi) be the inverse demand function in the market of firm i, then each
firm’s payoff function takes the form
V¯i = mi − xi p + p¯ii(zi, xi) where
p¯ii(zi, xi) = ziΦ¯i(zi)− Ci(zi, fi(zi)− (ωi + xi)).
To ensure that we can compare behavior in an independent monopoly market structure
with that in a competitive product market we require some equivalence between the
markets. Thus, we assume that if a firm supplies an identical quantity either as a mo-
nopolist or in a competitive market, then the price it will receive will be the same. With
the functions we have defined, this requires that for any vector of permit allocations x,
Φ¯i is such that
Φ¯i(z˜i(xi)) ≡ φ˜(xi, x−i).
We also assume Φ¯′i < 0 and 2Φ¯
′
i + ziΦ¯
′′
i < 0, which are the standard monotonicity
and decreasing marginal revenue assumptions that ensure concavity of firms’ product
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market profit functions.
For a given permit market allocation, the first-order condition governing optimal
behavior in the product market is dp¯ii(zi ,xi)dzi ≤ 0 with equality if zi > 0, implying
Czi (zi, fi(zi)− (ωi + xi)) + f ′(zi)Cai (zi, fi(zi)− (ωi + xi)) ≥ Φ¯i(zi) + ziΦ¯′i(zi).
We denote the solution by z¯i(xi) which is an interior solution since we assume Czi +
f ′i C
a
i = 0 when zi = 0.
With a given permit market allocation, a firm will supply less if it is an independent
monopolist compared to a perfectly competitive firm since it understands its influence
on the price. With a reduction in product supply and our given assumptions governing
market equivalence this implies z¯i(xi) < z˜i(xi) for all xi.
The reduced-form profit function (slightly abusing notation) is
p¯ii(xi) = z¯i(xi)Φ¯i(z¯i(xi))− Ci(z¯i(xi), fi(z¯i(xi))− (ωi + xi)).
The value of a change in permit market strategy on product market profitability is,
therefore,
dp¯ii(xi)
dsi
=
dp¯ii(xi)
dxi
dxi
dsi
=
dxi
dsi
[
dz¯i(xi)
dxi
[Φ¯i + z¯iΦ¯′i − (Czi + f ′Cai )] + Cai
]
=
dxi
dsi
Cai (z¯i(xi), fi(z¯i(xi))− (ωi + xi)).
As such, the permit market optimality condition has the same basic form as the case
of a competitive product market. However, as noted, an independent monopolist will
supply less to the market so the arguments in the function are different; as the marginal
cost of abatement increases with output ( dC
a
i
dzi
= Czai + f
′Caai > 0) this implies that an
independent monopolist will value permits less than a firm in a competitive market.
For a given permit market price this will reduce the demand from those firms that still
wish to buy permits, increase the supply of those firms that wish to sell permits, and
means that firms that previously wanted to acquire permits may now want to switch to
the supply side. The following proposition is derived.
Proposition 5. When firms are independent monopolists in the product market, strategic de-
mand (supply) for permits is always smaller (larger) compared to price-taking firms in the prod-
uct market. Consequently, the effect of market power in the product market is to lower the
equilibrium permit price.
Proof. First, we confirm that a firm supplies less as an independent monopolist than it
does as a price taker: z¯i(xi) < z˜i(xi) for all xi. With an output of z˜i(xi),
Φi(z˜i(xi)) + z˜i(xi)Φ¯′i(z˜i(xi)) = φ˜(xi, x−i) + z˜i(xi)Φ¯
′
i(z˜i(xi)) < φ˜(xi, x−i).
Since φ˜(xi, x−i) = Czi (z˜i(xi), fi(z˜i(xi))− (ωi + xi))+ f ′(z˜i(xi))Cai (z˜i(xi), fi(z˜i(xi))− (ωi +
xi)), this implies that Φ¯i(z˜i(xi)) + z˜i(xi)Φ¯′i(z˜i(xi)) < C
z
i (z˜i(xi), fi(z˜i(xi))− (ωi + xi)) +
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f ′(z˜i(xi))Cai (z˜i(xi), fi(z˜i(xi))− (ωi + xi)) and consequently the monotonicity of the left-
and right-hand sides of the first-order condition imply that z¯i(xi) < z˜i(xi).
Since Czai + f
′
i C
aa
i > 0 this implies that
Cai (z¯i(xi), fi(z¯i(xi))− (ωi + xi)) < Cai (z˜i(xi), fi(z˜i(xi))− (ωi + xi)) ∀xi. (20)
This allows us first to establish that the price at which a firm switches between being a
potential seller and potential buyer falls when they are an independent monopolist:
p¯∗i ≡ Cai (z¯i(0), fi(z¯i(0))−ωi)) < Cai (z˜i(0), fi(z˜i(0))−ωi)) ≡ p˜∗i ,
implying that at a given permit price p, firms are either sellers in both market structures;
buyers in both market structures; or switch from being a buyer to a seller, but not vice
versa.
Following the method of analysis in our discussion of comparative statics, the in-
equality in (20) implies that the selling share function in the permit market of an inde-
pendent monopolist will exceed that of a price taker, and the buying share function in
the permit market of an independent monopolist will be less than that of a price taker,
implying that if all firms are independent monopolists, the strategic demand for per-
mits will be lower, and the strategic supply of permits higher, than if all firms are price
takers, and consequently the equilibrium price of permits will fall.
4.2 Oligopolistic product market
When firms compete in both the permit and product market the interaction between
markets is much richer. The effect of trading permits changes the firm’s cost function
for the product market and, importantly, influences the marginal cost of production.
If the market is perfectly competitive (or if firms serve independent monopolies), this
‘direct effect’ of permit market activity is the only effect that influences firms’ optimal
output. If strategic behavior is considered in the product market, however, the outcome
from engaging in Cournot competition hinges crucially on the firm’s marginal cost in
relation to those of its competitors. This raises two additional effects of permit market
activity: an ‘indirect effect’ that results from the change in the product market equi-
librium attributable to a change in the firm’s own marginal cost; and, since the total
number of permits is fixed, a ‘changing rivals’ costs’ effect that results from a change in
the product market equilibrium attributable to the change in other firms’ marginal costs.
These effects provide an additional incentive to acquire permits, thereby (at least) par-
tially mitigating the suppressed net demand for permits that occurs due to the existence
of product market power (and therefore restricting output).
To consider the effect of strategic interaction in the product market, suppose that the
firms participating in the permit market then go on to supply the same product market
in which they compete à la Cournot. The price in the goods market will be determined
as Φ(Z), which depends on the aggregate supply of all firms Z = ∑ni=1 zi. Consider a
product market subgame in which the vector of permit allocations is x = {xi}ni=1. In this
subgame, we want to deduce the Cournot equilibrium. The payoff function of firm i in
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this subgame takes the form
Vi = mi − xi p + pii(zi, Z, xi) where
pii(zi, Z, xi) = ziΦ(Z)− Ci(zi, f (zi)− (ωi + xi)).
When engaging in Cournot competition firms can be seen as maximizing their payoff
with respect to zi, taking the actions of other traders as given, which implies
Czi + f
′
Cai ≥ Φ(Z) + ziΦ
′
(Z),
with equality if zi > 0. Since we assume Czi + f
′
i C
a
i = 0 when zi = 0 each firm will
be active in a Cournot equilibrium, and we denote by zˆi(Z; xi) the output of firm i
consistent with a Nash equilibrium in which the aggregate supply of all firms is Z,
which satisfies the above first-order condition with equality. A Nash equilibrium in
the subgame requires that these consistent individual supplies are also consistent with
the aggregate supply. As such, the aggregate supply at the Cournot equilibrium in the
subgame in which the vector of permit allocations is x is given by Zˆ(x), defined by:
Zˆ(x) = {Z :
n
∑
i=1
zˆi(Z; xi)− Z = 0}. (21)
Notice that this depends on the entire vector of permit allocations. The equilibrium
supply of firm i is then written zˆi(Zˆ(x); xi). Our assumptions on demand and cost
functions imply that individual ‘replacement functions’ zˆi(Z; xi) are decreasing in Z
and therefore that ∑ni=1 zˆi(Z; xi) is decreasing in Z so there is a unique fixed point and
so a unique Cournot equilibrium.24
Returning now to first-stage decisions in the permit market, the reduced-form payoff
function for firm i is
Vi = mi − xi p + pii(zˆi(Zˆ(x); xi), Zˆ(x), xi) where
pii(zˆi(Zˆ(x); xi), Zˆ(x), xi) = zˆi(Zˆ(x); xi)φ(Zˆ(x))− Ci(zˆi(Zˆ(x); xi), f (zˆi(Zˆ(x); xi))− (ωi + xi)).
When considering its optimal action in the permit market, a firm needs to consider the
marginal effect on its allocation of permits and the benefits (or costs) that this brings in
terms of product market profitability. With s = {b, q}, the first-order condition govern-
ing optimal behavior in the permit market requires
dpii(zˆi(Zˆ(x); xi), Zˆ(x), xi)
dsi
≤ dxi p
dsi
.
The right-hand side of this first-order condition is the same as when we assumed the
firm is a price-taker in the product market. The left-hand side, however, is somewhat
different as it accounts not only for the direct effect of permit market activity on product
market profitability, but also the indirect and changing rivals’ cost effects.
Decomposing the effect of permit market activity on product market profitability, we
24This method was first used in the analysis of Cournot equilibrium by Novshek (1985).
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find
dpii
dsi
=
∂pii
∂xi
dxi
dsi
+
∂pii
∂zi
dzˆi
dsi
+
∂pii
∂Z
dZˆ
dsi
. (22)
Now, in the second term,
dzˆi
dsi
=
∂zˆi
∂xi
dxi
dsi
+
∂zˆi
∂Z
dZˆ
dsi
. (23)
In both (22) and (23) the effect on the equilibrium aggregate output dZˆdsi can be decom-
posed into the direct effect from firm i’s permit market strategy, and the indirect effect
that comes through firm i’s strategy influencing the permit holdings of other firms:
dZˆ
dsi
=
∂Zˆ
∂xi
dxi
dsi
+∑
j 6=i
∂Z
∂xj
dxj
dsi
. (24)
Inserting (24) and (23) into the initial decomposition (22) and re-arranging yields
dpii
dsi
=
∂pii
∂xi
dxi
dsi
+
dpii
dzi
∂zˆi
∂xi
dxi
dsi
(25)
+
(
∂pii
∂zi
∂zˆi
∂Z
+
∂pii
∂Z
)
∂Zˆ
∂xi
dxi
dsi
+
(
∂pii
∂zi
∂zˆi
∂Z
+
∂pii
∂Z
)
∑
j 6=i
∂Zˆ
∂xj
dxj
dsi
.
The first line of (25) captures the direct effect of permit market activity on profit that
comes about from a change in optimal supply; the second line captures the indirect
effect of permit market activity that comes from the change in firm i’s permit holdings
influencing the equilibrium in the product market; and the third line captures the chang-
ing rivals’ cost effect that changes the product market equilibrium indirectly through the
effect of firm i’s actions on the permit holdings of others. Note that in the final term
dxj
dsi
= 0 for those traders j 6= i that are sellers of permits, since their permit allocation is
unilaterally decided by xj = −qj, so the changing rivals’ cost effect only materializes for
firms on the demand side of the permit market.
This expression presents two complications for a general model of trade in permits.
First, it depends on the whole vector of permit allocations implying optimal permit
market actions cannot be written only as a function of aggregations of others’ strate-
gies; consequently, this makes the analysis of permit market equilibrium that relied on
the aggregative properties of the game more complicated. In Dickson and MacKenzie
(2016) we show that this is tractable for conventional cost and demand functional forms
used in the environmental economics literature. Second, the sign of dpiidsi is ambiguous.
Consider the decision of a permit buyer that engages in a strategic product market com-
pared to the buyer in a competitive product market. Their output in a strategic market
will be less than in a competitive market which will serve to reduce their demand for
permits. However, by acquiring permits the firm lowers its marginal cost relative to oth-
ers: purchasing permits reduces its own marginal cost and simultaneously increases the
marginal costs of other permit buyers since any permits acquired by the firm in ques-
tion cannot be acquired by other firms. These strategic considerations serve to increase
the demand for permits. Which of these effects dominates depends on a multitude of
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factors, not least the competitiveness of the product market and the firm’s market power
in that market.
5 Conclusion
The purpose of this article is to investigate the implications of strategic trade in pollution
markets. By establishing a strategic market game where firms’ roles as buyers or sellers
are determined endogenously, we create a two-stage framework, where in the first stage
firms participate in a price-mediated permit market and, in the second stage, firms select
their level of production.
In the permit market, we use a strategic market game to identify firms’ roles as
buyers or sellers of permits and allow for price-mediated trade. We show that the
equilibrium is generically inefficient even if trade in permits takes place, and indeed
that the only equilibrium may involve no trade if there are insufficient gains from trade.
Our framework also shows that strategic trade can alter the structure of the market, as
the role of firms (buyers or sellers) and the equilibrium price are now endogenously
determined: buyers (sellers) in a competitive market can switch their role in a market
with strategic trade. Thus we show the use of strategic trade via a price-mediated
strategic market game has fundamental consequences for the cost efficiency, level of
exchange, equilibrium permit price, and structure of the market.
As cap-and-trade markets are now frequently implemented to control major pol-
lution problems, it is important to identify how, in the presence of non-competitive
behavior, the market equilibrium is established, and, of course, the associated cost in-
efficiencies. Our approach, by focusing on endogenous market formation and a price-
mediated solution, has identified the fundamental links between strategic behavior, cost
inefficiency, market formation, and the nature of the equilibrium.
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